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COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

JANET T. MILLIKAN,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

Case No. 880213-CA

vs.

)

CLARK H. MILLIKAN,

)

District Court

)

D-86-2818

Defendant-Respondent.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In her Brief

of Appellant, Mrs. Millikan cites authority

involving abuse of discretion and unjust apportionment of marital
property.

She asked the trial court to award her a present lump

sum payment of her share of the cash valqe of the Utah and Mayo
retirement assets.
risk.

The

trial court made no distribution whatsoever of the

Utah and Mayo
Millikan

She testified about the problematic issue of

retirement

the entire

realize any of

assets, and placed solely upon Mrs.

burden of surviving Dr. Millikan to ever

those retirement assets.

The only retirement

asset the trial court awarded her was an $8,319 I R A — 1 . 8 * of the
$451,580.53 in total retirement assets.
The

trial

court wrongly

excluded

the Scheinberg letter,

which contained the most probative and trustworthy evidence Mrs.
Millikan was ever able to obtain regarding the material fact of
Dr. Millikan 1 s Miami private patient income.

The trial court

denied her a continuance to complete discovery of that information.

The inability to discover Dr. Millikan 1 s private patient

income continues to prejudice Mrs. Millikan 1 s substantial right
to alimony.
The trial court erroneously used the homeowners1 policy 60%
valuation of household contents in finding the average valuation
of those contents.

Instead, the trial court should have used the

valuation Dr. Millikan made in the 27-page inventory supporting
the policy.

The valuation error amounted to 25% of the actual

average value of the contents.
This Court has already denied Dr. Millikan 1 s claim that Mrs.
Millikan's appeal is frivolous and request for costs.

This Court

should not reconsider those issues.
An immediate offset award
interest

to Mrs. Millikan now of her 31%

in the Utah and Mayo

retirements

does not preclude

consideration of Dr. Millikan's monthly retirement benefits in
determining alimony.

The case law Dr. Millikan cites has been

expressly disapproved.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

MRS. MILLIKAN'S CLAIM OF REVERSIBLE ERROR,
BASED UPON THE TRIAL COURT'S ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND UNJUST APPORTIONMENT OF
MARITAL PROPERTY, IS MORE THAN SUSTAINED
BY THE RECORD IN THIS MATTER.

At the outset of argument

in her Brief of Appellant, Mrs.

Millikan cites Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P. 2d 86 (Utah App. 1988)
in support

of Point

reversible

error

substantial

Utah

I there

that

the

trial

court

committed

in failing to find the present value of the
and

immediate offset award.

Mayo

retirement

interests

and make

an

The Carlton cite provides, in pertinent

part:
2

, . . Finally, the trial court's failure to include
property valuations in divorce actions may constitute
an abuse of discretion sufficient to.require remand for
determination. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074; Boyle
v. Boyle, 735 P.2d"at 671.
756 P. 2d at pp. 87-88.
added]

[Brief of Appellant, p. 17; emphasis

This Court vacated

the property award

in Carlton and

remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Likewise, in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d

1076 (Utah 1988)

the Utah Supreme Court cited the standard of review in a divorce
proceeding:
In a divorce proceeding, the trial court should make a
distribution of property and income sd that the parties
may readjust their lives to their new circumstances as
well as possible.
Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah
1982); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P. 2d
1066 (1951).
Although this Court may modify decisions
of the trial court, its apportionment of marital
property will not be disturbed unless it is clearly
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion.
Turner, 649
P.2d at 8.
748 P.2d at 1078.
Mrs. Millikan's claim of reversible error, based upon the
trial

court's abuse of discretion and unjust apportionment of

marital property, is more than sustained by the record in this
matter.
POINT II.

A.

THE VALUATION AND APPORTIONMENT OF THE
RETIREMENT ASSETS BEING PROPERLY BEFORE
THIS COURT, CONTROLLING AUTHORITY ENTITLES
MRS. MILLIKAN TO AN IMMEDIATE OFFSET AWARD
NOW OF HER 31* EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THOSE
RETIREMENT ASSETS.

The Issue of Valuation and Apportionment of the $405,603.53
Utah and Mayo Retirements is Properly Before this Court.
In Duqan

v. Jones, 724 P.2d

Supreme Court wrote:

3

955

(Utah

1986),

the

Utah

An objection to findings of fact and conclusions of law
may be made in the form of a motion for a new trial or
amendment of judgment, procedures governed by Rule
52(b) and Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
"It is settled that . . . a rule 59 motion is [not] a
condition precedent to appeal from final judgment.11
The Nature Conservancy v. Nakila, 4 Hawaii App. 584,
671 P.2d 1025 (1983); Kahn v. Weldin, 60 Or. App. 365,
653 P.2d 1268 (1982); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Sweat,
568 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1977).
6A J. Moore, Federal
P r a c t i c e § 5 9 . 1 5 [ 3 ] (2d Ed. 1986) addresses the
submitted issue in language as follows:
A motion for a new trial is not a prerequisite for an appeal from a judgment; and on
such appeal review may be had of any legal
error, properly raised, that appears in the
record, whether the action be a jury or court
action.
And in the latter action the scope
of review also embraces the facts, but the
trial court's findings of fact are not to be
set aside by the appellate court unless
clearly erroneous.
In this proceeding in equity, this Court is free to
review both the facts and the law as found and applied
by the trial court, but will not disturb the trial
court's findings of facts unless the evidence clearly
preponderates against them.
In re Estate of Hock, 655
P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982); Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150
(Utah 1981); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P. 2d 708
(Utah 1977). The failure to object to the findings was
not fatal to defendants1 appeal. . ..
724 P.2d at 956-957.
While Mrs. Millikan may not have objected immediately after
trial

to

the retirement

counsel, nevertheless

findings prepared

it is crystal

by Dr. Millikan's

clear that Mrs. Millikan

asked the trial court to award her a present lump sum payment of
her share of the cash value of the Mayo and Utah retirements.
Her request, and her analysis of the problematic issue of risk,
are set out in full in Addendum "E" to her Brief of Appellant.
Her request was clear:

4

Mr, Palmer: Are you asking now for the court to award
you a present lump sum payment of your share of the
cash value of those annuities?
Mrs. Millikan:
Yes, I would very much like to have
that because otherwise, if I am just left with future
money, it is not worth nearly as much as present money.
Obviously, that would take care of my needs, and it
would be immediate.
And it wouldn't have to be a
future possible thing.
There is a lot of risk,
obviously, in hoping to get something in 10 or 15
years, especially with the history of cancer in my
family.
Q. And if Dr. Millikan were to pay out now your share
of the present value of those plans, he would then be
taking the risk that he would not live long enough to
reap his share?
A. Yes, that's correct.
think.
[Tr. December 1, 1987:
Brief of Appellant)].

It is a difficult problem, I

243-245/R. 482:

243-245 (Addendum "E" to

The remainder of Mrs. Millikan's testimony

regarding the problematic issue of risk is set out in Addendum
"E" to the Brief of Appellant.
Mrs. Millikan's testimony regarding the problematic issue of
risk hardly constitutes a waiver of her right to an award of a
present lump sum payment of her share of the present cash value
of the Mayo and Utah retirements.

Barnes v. Wood, 750 P. 2d 1226

(Utah App. 1988); Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d
573

(Utah

1985);

Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d

430

(Utah 1983);

Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 547 P. 2d 219 (Utah 1976); and
American

Savings & Loan Association v. Blomguist, 445 P.2d 1

(Utah 1968).
Mrs.

Millikan

trial court.
make

findings

left

the problematic

issue of risk to the

The trial court ducked that issue by failing to
on

the

basis

of undisputed
5

evidence

of

the

$405,603.53 present value of the Utah and Mayo retirements.
trial

court's

abuse

of discretion

in failing

to make

The
those

findings, and the clearly unjust and equitable apportionment of
marital property resulting therefrom, should be reversed by this
Court.
It cannot

be disputed

that Mrs. Millikan asked the trial

court to award her a present lump sum payment of her share of the
present cash value of the Mayo and Utah retirements.
was before the trial court.

That issue

That issue is properly before this

Court now.
B.

Dr. Millikan ! s Improper Attempts to Supplement the Record Do
• Not Preclude an Award to Mrs. Millikan of her $125,848.07
Interest in the Mayo and Utah Retirements.
In Corbet

v. Corbet, 472 P.2d

430

(Utah 1970),

the Utah

Supreme Court stated the general rule against supplementing the
record on appeal with matters not before the trial court.

Chief

Justice Crockett wrote:
. On Appeal to this court we review the judgments
and orders appealed from on the basis of the record
upon which the trial court acted, and do not permit the
supplementing of our record with matters not before the
trial court.
472 P.2d

at 433.

(Footnotes omitted.)

See also, Blodqett v.

Zions First Nat. Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1988); Chapman v.
Chapman, 728 P.2d 121 (Utah 1986); Matter of Estate of Cluff, 587
P.2d

128

(Utah 1978); and Watkiss v. Symonds, 385 P. 2d 154, 14

Utah 2d 406 (Utah 1963),
Dr.

Millikan attempts

to supplement the record on appeal

with Addendums A, B and C to his Brief in Answer to Appeal and in
Support of Cross-Appeal

("Dr.

Millikan's Brief").
6

The materials

in Addendum A and C were admittedly never before the trial court.
(Dr. Millikan f s Brief, p. 28)

The proper way to get Addendum B

before this Court is by motion under Rule 11(b) of the Rules of
this Court.

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d

14 (Utah 1988).

Dr.

Millikan f s attempts to supplement the record are clearly improper.

In addition, they miss the mark.
Mrs. Millikan

is not seeking and indeed has never sought

lump sum payments from the Mayo or Utah plans.

As set forth on

pages 30 to 33 of her Brief of Appellant, Mrs. Millikan seeks an
award of $125,848.07 for her interest in the Mayo and Utah plans
from the $272,997.13 in CD's, an IRA and annuity the trial court
awarded Dr. Millikan.

The marital assets are clearly sufficient

to permit the present lump sum cash award Mrs. Millikan asked the
trial court to make.
C.

Controlling Authority Entitles Mrs. Millikan to an Immediate
Offset Award Now of Her 31% Equitable Interest in the Joint
Marital Retirement Assets.
Dr. Millikan attempts to distinguish the retirement distri-

bution cases cited by Mrs. Millikan on the basis that "they are
addressed

to retirement plans where the spouse had no entitle-

ments to the retirement benefits without a court award."
Millikan's

Brief, p. 32.)

(Dr.

That hollow distinction without a

difference begs the question.

-In this case, if Mrs. Millikan

predeceases Dr. Millikan she has no entitlement

to the retire-

ments even with a court award.
Dr. Millikan
receive

laboriously argues that "Mrs. Millikan will

roughly 57% of the entire benefits."

Brief, p. 33; emphasis

in original.)
7

(Dr. Millikanfs

If she dies before Dr.

Millikan, she will

receive

nothing is still nothing.

nothing.

Fifty-seven percent of

Mrs. Millikan is not "full protected"

in her right to enjoy her share of Dr. Millikan's

considerable

retirement assets.
Mrs. Millikan asks only for a fair and equitable distribution now of her equitable interest in the $405,603.53 in Mayo and
Utah retirement assets.
sometime

in

the

Rather than settle for a "windfall" 57%

future jL_f she

survives

Dr. Millikan, Mrs.

Millikan willingly asks now for the mere 31% to which she is
undisputediy entitled.
Dr. Millikan cites no case law whatsoever where an election
under ERISA precludes a state trial court from making an immediate offset distribution of retirement assets.
election" argument is a red herring at best.
to the trial court.

The "irrevocable
It was attractive

This Court should reject it for the spurious

argument that it is.
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to find the
undisputed present value of the Utah and Mayo retirements.
trial

court

compounded

that

abuse by making

The

.no distribution

whatsoever of the Mayo and Utah retirement assets.

This Court

should reverse the trial court's non-distribution of retirement
assets and remand for entry of an immediate offset cash award to
Mrs. Millikan of $125,848.07 for her equitable interest in those
retirement assets.
POINT III.

Property

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS AWARD OF THE
IRA ASSETS.

settlement

agreements
8

are not binding upon the

trial court in divorce proceedings.
473 (Utah App. 1988).
of

Nunley v. Nunley, 757 P. 2d

The trial court failed to find the value

the Mayo and Utah retirements and make an . immediate offset

lump sum award of $125,848.07 to Mrs. Millikan.
further

abused

The trial court

its discretion in failing to find each party's

respective percentage interest in the $45,J977 in IRA's and make
an award to each party in accordance with those percentages.

The

net result is that Mrs. Millikan was awarded only $8,319 of the
$451,580.53 in Utah, Mayo and IRA retirement assets, a mere 1.8%.
This is not equitable.
The trial
The

trial

court's award of the IRA's should be reversed.

court

should

be

instructed

to

find

each

party's

percentage interest in both IRA's and make awards in accordance
with those percentages.
POINT IV.

A.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN REFUSING TO ADMIT THE SCHEINBERG LETTER
OR GRANT MRS. MILLIKAN A CONTINUANCE TO
COMPLETE DISCOVERY OF DR. MILLIKAN'S MIAMI
PRIVATE PATIENT INCOME.

The Scheinberg Letter Should Have Been Admitted Under Rule
303(24) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Dr. Millikan does not deny entering into an agreement with

Mrs.

Millikan

to accomplish

discovery

of Dr.

Scheinberg's

evidence regarding Dr. Millikan's private patient income at the
University

of Miami.

On page

37 of his Brief, Dr. Millikan

states:
. . . The parties agreed to interview Dr. Scheinberg by
telephone to avoid the cost of travel to Miami.
On page 40, Dr. Millikan states:

9

. , . The depositions of Dr. Scheinberg and the payroll
clerk were cancelled by stipulation and counsel
interrogated Dr. Scheinberg by telephone.
(R. 482Tr. at 258. )
It can readily be inferred

from Dr. Millikan's

admissions

that any information obtained from Dr. Scheinberg in that threeway telephone interview would be in lieu of the depositions Mrs.
Millikan had scheduled and that Mrs. Millikan would be entitled
to rely on that information.

It can also be readily

inferred

that Mrs. Millikan was surprised when, in contravention of the
agreement, Dr. Millikan objected to the admission of Dr. Scheinberg ' s letter to Mr. Palmer regarding information discovered in
the course of that three-way telephone conference.
attests to the surprise.

The record

(R. 329-343; 482 - Tr. 249-273.)

Similarly, Dr. Millikan does not deny that Mrs. Millikan was
unable

to complete

his

two-day

deigned

to be available.

justify

his evasiveness.

Millikan

or any

of her

deposition

Rather, Dr. Millikan

1987 discovery,

attorneys

Millikan's

October

her

could

September

income

Scheinberg,

pursuant

to

not get

satisfactory

1986 discovery, her

1987 discovery, or in Dr.

1987 half-completed

satisfactory

attempts

He argues, in essence, that if Mrs.

income information from him in her October
May

in the one day he

deposition, then what

information she finally did get from Dr.
to the three-way

telephone-conference-in-

lieu-of-deposition agreement, he really did not intend she could
use.

The trial court committed reversible error in excluding the

Scheinberg
complete

letter

discovery

and refusing mrs. Millikan a continuance to
of

Dr. Millikan's

income.
10

Miami

private

patient

Rule 803(24)
Rule 803(24) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule,
even though the declarant is available as a witness:

(24) Other exceptions.
A statement not specifically
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it
is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purpose of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent
of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.
Rule 803 is the federal rule verbatim.
In United

States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d

294, 298 (5th

1977), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled:
In order for evidence to be admitted pursuant to Rule
803(24), five conditions must be met. These are:
(1) The proponent of the evidence must give the adverse
party the notice specified within the rule.
(2) The statement must have circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness equivalent to the 23 specified
exceptions listed in Rule 803.
(3)
The statement must be offered as evidence of a
material fact.
(4) The statement must be more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts.
(5) The general purposes of the Federal Rules and the
interests of justice must best be served by admission
of the statement into evidence.
11

559 F.2d at 298.
In Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979),
the United
vacated

States

summary

Court

of Appeals

judgment

for

the Seventh

for a determination

Circuit

of whether the

deceased declarant was mentally competent when he made a statement

the trial

court

803(24) mandated

excluded.

admission

If competent, Federal

Rule

of the statement and a new trial.

Utah Rule 803(24) should similarly apply here.
Notice
Mrs. Millikan made the letter and her intention to offer it
at trial known to Dr. Millikan sufficiently in advance of trial
to provide Dr. Millikan a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it.
(R. 482: 263, lines 7-22.)
name and

Dr. Millikan knew Dr. Scheinberg's

address; Dr. Scheinberg was Dr. Millikan's

long-time

friend and immediate supervisor.
Trustworthiness
The Scheinberg letter possessed circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.

He was

Millikan was concerned.

a hostile

witness

so

far

as Mrs.

There was no reason for him to invent

the private patient income information the letter contained.
The evidence

the

letter

contained

was developed

in the

course of a stipulated three-way telephone-conference-in-lieu-ofdeposition held between Dr. Scheinberg, Mrs. Millikan 1 s counsel,
and

Dr. Millikan's

counsel.

Dr. Millikan's

counsel

had

an

opportunity in that stipulated three-way telephone conference to
explore any weaknesses

in Dr. Scheinberg's perceptions, memory,

and narrative of the matters he later reduced to writing and sent
12

to Dr. Millikan ! s counsel.

(R. 482: 249-273.)

Evidence of a Material Fact
The Scheinberg letter was offered as evidence of a material
fact, namely that the University of Miami would collect approximately $80,000 in income from private patients Dr. Millikan would
attend

over

the term of his

Millikan would

gross about

15-month

contract, and that Dr.

$1,920 of that as private patient

income in addition to his regular income.

(R. 482 - Tr. 265,

lines 20-24.)
More Probative Than Any Other Evidence
The Scheinberg letter was more probative on the point of Dr.
Millikan 1 s Miami private patient income that any other evidence
Mrs. Millikan was able to procure in either her May 1987 discovery, her September 1987 discovery, or in Dr. Millikan's October
1987 half-completed deposition.

Mrs. Millikan was prepared to

depose Dr. Scheinberg and the payroll clerk in Miami, but agreed
by stipulation with Dr. Millikan to cancel the Miami depositions
to avoid
Scheinberg

the

cost

of

travel

in a three-way

to Miami

and

to interview Dr.

telephone conference with Dr. Mil-

likan1 s counsel.
Mrs. Millikan's

efforts

to procure evidence of Dr. Mil-

likan ! s Miami private patient income were more than reasonable.
That evidence just was not forthcoming.
The Interests of Justice
Admissibility

of the Scheinberg

letter would

consistent with the interests of justice.

have

been

The trial court would

have had available a range of private patient income upon which
13

to base an alimony award:

the $650 net per month Dr. Millikan

was willing to admit and the $1,920 gross per month derived from
the Scheinberg letter.

Admission of the Scheinberg letter could

well have resulted in an additional $400 per month in alimony to
Mrs. Millikan.
As it is, Mrs. Millikan has been left to file an Order to
Show Cause with the Domestic Commissioner in May, 1989, seeking
judgment
based

against

Dr. Millikan

for accrued alimony arrearages

upon evidence of his "regular, " "PIP," and

"incentive"

income from the University of Miami.
Proffer
Mrs. Millikan ! s counsel made a proffer of the Scheinberg
letter evidence and argued its admissibility under Rule 803(24).
Mrs.

Millikan f s

prejudiced

substantial

by the

trial

right

court's

to additional

exclusion

of

alimony was

the Scheinberg

letter and denial of a continuance.
B.

The Issue of Dr. Millikan's Miami Private Patient Income is
Not Moot.
In May,

with

1989, Mrs. Millikan filed an Order to Show Cause

the Domestic

Commissioner

seeking

judgment

against Dr.

Millikan for accrued alimony arrearages based upon evidence of
his "regular," "PIP," and "incentive" income from the University
of Miami,

Dr. Millikan 1 s "regular" income check was admitted as

Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" at trial.
"I,"

Exhibit

"D.")

(Brief of Appellant, Addendum

However, Dr. Millikan sent Mrs. Millikan

copies of his "PIP" checks with his alimony.
checks

included

"incentive"

income.

Addendum "I," Exhibit "E.")
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Some of his "PIP"

(Brief

of

Appellant,

That Dr. Millikan

only sent Mrs. Millikan copies of his

,f

PIPn and "incentive" pay does not render, the Miami income issue

moot.

Instead,

it illustrates

faced all along:
from all

the problem Mrs. Millikan has

Just how much income does Dr. Millikan derive

sources?

Because he has never sent Mrs. Millikan a

complete copy of his 1987 or 1988 federal income tax return as
required by paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce, Mrs. Millikan
still

does not know what his combined

"regular,"

"PIP," and

"incentive" income was from the University of Miami, even though
he left there a year ago.
The Scheinberg letter should have been admitted at trial or
upon

its denial, Mrs. Millikan

continuance

should

to complete discovery

patient income.

have

been

granted

of Dr. Millikan's

a

private

Mrs. Millikan has been substantially prejudiced

by the exclusion of that evidence and the denial of a continuance .
This Court should reverse the trial court's exclusion of the
Scheinberg

letter on the basis of Rule 803(24) or remand with

instructions to permit Mrs. Millikan to complete discovery of Dr.
Millikan 1 s Miami private patient income prior to retrial on the
issue of alimony.
POINT V.

The
attached

trial

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN USING THE HOMEOWNERS' POLICY STANDARD
60* HOUSEHOLD CONTENTS VALUATION AS EVIDENCE
IN AVERAGING THE PARTIES' VALUATIONS OF
THE HOUSEHOLD CONTENTS.
court

found

the 23-page

typewritten

to the Family Affairs appraisal

Addendum "J") to be "very incomplete."
15

inventory

(Brief of Appellant,

(R. 482 - Tr. at 342.)

That appraisal valued the household contents at $43,300.35, with
a net value after commission of $30,310.
In his handwritten
Addendum

four-page addition

(Brief of Appellant,

"J," pp. "24-27"), Dr. Millikan valued the woodworking

equipment and wood at $20,776.

Mrs. Millikan's figures off to

the right valued the equipment and wood at $14,226.96.
Appellant, p. 45.)

(Brief of

Dr. Millikan never disputed Mrs. Millikan's

valuations of the items in the first 23 pages of inventory.

His

complaint was simply that she forgot to include the woodworking
equipment and wood.
As set out on page 45 of the Brief of Appellant, the range
of values established by the parties 1

own inventory valuations

would have been $56,438.35 for a high and $49,451.42 for a low.
Both of this figures are less that the $66,155 valuation found by
the trial court.
The homeowners' policy was admitted by stipulation.
impeachment

value

inventory supporting

lay

in the

27-page

it, and not

typed

and

Its

handwritten

in the $102,000 Mrs. Millikan

testified was 60% of the revised appraised value of the structure.

(R. 482 - Tr. at 435.)
The

trial court erred

in splitting the difference between

the $102,000 policy valuation and the Family Affairs appraisal
value of $30,310 [($102,000 + $30,310) / 2 = $66,155], instead of
splitting the difference between the policy's 27-page inventory
as valued by Dr. Millikan ($56,438.35) and the Family Affairs 23page

inventory

furnished

by Mrs. Millikan

($49,451.42).

The

correct valuation, using Mrs. Millikan's Family Affairs evidence
16

and Dr. Millikan's 27-page policy inventory impeachment evidence
should have been:
+

$56,438.35
49,451.42
$105,889.77

/

2 = $52,944.89

This Court should reverse the trial court's valuation of the
household contents at $66,155 and order entry of a valuation of
$52,944.89, a substantial twenty percent reduction in valuation.
POINT VI.

THE DOCTRINE OF LAW OF THE CASE PRECLUDES
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUES OF FRIVOLOUS
APPEAL AND AWARD OF COSTS.

In Point IV of his June 6, 1988 Motion of Defendant/Respondent for Summary Affirmance of Judgment and for Attorney's Fees
and Costs ("Dr.

Millikan's Motion for Summary Affirmance"), Dr.

Mlllikan claimed there was no arguable basis for an assertion of
error by the district court and that Mrs. Mlllikan's appeal was
frivolous.

Dr. Millikan moved this Court for an Order awarding

him double costs.
same claim.

Point Six of Dr. Millikan's Brief makes the

In fact, much of the language is identical and he

seeks identical relief.
This
Summary

Court

summarily

Affirmance,

denied

thereby

Dr. Millikan's

Motion

for

denying his claim that Mrs. Mil-

likan's appeal is frivolous and denying him double costs.

Those

denials are the law of the case and preclude reconsideration of
the identical

issues raised in Dr. Millikan's Brief.

State in

Interest of C. Y. v. Yates, 765 P.2d 251 (Utah App. 1988).
The

issues of

frivolous appeal and double costs are pre-

sented in the same light in Dr. Mlllikan's brief as in his Motion
for Summary Affirmance.

No exception to the doctrine of law of
17

the case applies.
P. 2d 735

(Utah

Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692
1984).

This Court should again deny Dr. Mil-

likan's claim of frivolous appeal and motion for costs.
POINT VII.

ALIMONY AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION INVOLVE
FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS WHICH
PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF "DOUBLE COUNTING"

Dr. Millikan cites D' Pro v. D'Oro, 454 A.2d 915 (N.J. Sup.
Ct.

1982) for

considered

the proposition that pension benefits cannot be

income

to the recipient

(Dr. Millikan's Brief, p. 63.)

for an alimony assessment.

However, in Innes v. Innes f 542

A.2d 39 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1988), the Appellate Division of
the New Jersey Superior Court expressly disapproved as "superficial" and "unsound" the rationale in D'Pro:
The argument is unsound because equitable distribution
and alimony are not the same.
They are fundamentally
different in one important respect:
[Equitable distribution to a wife] gives
recognition to the essential supportive role
played by the wife in the home, acknowledging
that as homemaker, wife and mother she should
clearly be entitled to a share of family
assets a c c u m u l a t e d during the marriage.
Thus, the division of property upon divorce
is responsive to the concept that marriage is
a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking,
that in many ways it is akin to a partnership.] Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229,
320 A.2d 496 (1974) . ]
Alimony, on the other hand, is meant to impose on the
supporting spouse the duty to give the dependent spouse
sufficient financial support, within the means of the
supporting spouse, to continue to live according to the
economic standard that was established during the
marriage.
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 501-502,
453 A.2d 527 (1982) .

This relationship between equitable distribution and
alimony may require the dependent spouse to tap her
a s s e t s , including property received in equitable
18

distribution, to absorb some of the diminution of the
supporting spouse's ability to pay alimony when upon
retirement his earned income is replaced by lower
pension payments.

We reject the D ! Pro rule that whenever upon divorce a
dependent spouse receives a lump sum share of the value
of the supporting spouse's anticipated pension payments
as part of equitable distribution, those pension
payments or any portion thereof are not to be considered in readjusting alimony after the supporting
spouse retires. The same is true for other assets that
spouses acquired in equitable distribution,
542 A.2d at 41-42.
Under Innes and the cases cited in Point II of the Brief of
Appellant, the trial court should consider Dr. Millikan's income
from all sources in awarding Mrs. Millikan alimony.
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion and failed to make an
equitable apportionment of the joint marital retirement assets.
The

trial

court's non-distribution

should

be reversed, with

instructions to find the $405,603.53 present value of the Mayo
and Utah retirement assets and award Mrs. Millikan an immediate
offset

award

of

$125,848.07,

together

with

her

percentage

interest in the $45,977 in IRA's.
The trial court committed reversible error in excluding Dr.
Scheinberg's
income.

letter

regarding

Dr. Millikan's private patient

The trial court should be instructed to admit the letter

or grant Mrs. Millikan the opportunity to complete discovery of
Dr. Millikan's private patient income prior to retrial of the
alimony issue.

The trial court should be instructed to base its

determination of alimony upon a consideration of Dr. Millikan's
19

income from all sources, including retirement benefits.
the

trial

homeowners'

court

policy

committed

reversible error in using the

60% valuation figure, rather

than Dr. Mil-

likan's valuation of the 27-page inventory supporting the policy.
The

issue of valuation

remanded

for entry

of

the household

contents

of the average valuation

based

should

be

upon

the

parties' actual figures, $52,944.89.
This Court

should

appeal and request

deny Dr. Millikan's claim of

for costs under the doctrine of

n

frivolous

law of the

case."
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